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Noms AND CommNT'rs
AGENCY-LIABILITY OF NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES FOR
TORTS OF SERVICE STATION OPERATORS
The National Oil Companies have experimented with various
methods of retailing during the past half century. Under one such
method the company owns the station and directly employs at-
tendants to operate it. A second method is an arrangement whereby
the company owns the station or leases it and in turn leases or sub-
leases it to an independent operator. A third method is one by which
the owner of the station contracts with the company to market the
latter's products. All three of these situations, regardless of any dif-
ference in the legal or contractual relation between the companies
and the dealers or operators, present a picture of uniformity to the
average motorist. When he purchases his gasoline at various filling
stations he is usually unaware that a variety of contractual relation-
ships exist between the several dealers with whom he does business
and the national oil companies whose products he actually uses,
because modem methods of uniform retailing and advertising have
destroyed the individualistic character of the present day gasoline
filling station. The institution of national credit card systems, national
advertising, uniform station designing, construction and exterior deco-
ration, plus the fact that many service station attendants wear uni-
forms representing the national oil companies have caused the motor-
ist of today to feel that he is purchasing products directly from the
national company which he patronizes. No longer does the average
motorist, when traveling along the highway, feel that he is doing
business with Tom Jones as an independent filling station operator
but with the X Oil Company whose stations he finds throughout his
travels, whose maps he uses and through whose national credit card
system he charges his purchases.
The courts have been forced to go behind the uniform marketing
systems of national oil companies in order to find the true relationship
between them and the dealers who operate the comer filling stations.
This discussion is not concerned with the company owned and
operated station, but rather with those stations which are operated
by lessees or independent parties who are not directly employed by
the national oil companies.' It will be helpful to examine first the
relation between the station operator and the national oil company.2
'For a discussion of this and related topics see: Mechem, OuTLnE OF To E
LAW OF AGENCY sec. 440-45 (4th ed. 1952); 38 MIcH. L. REv. 1068 (1940); 1
OKLA. L. REv. 277 (1948); 20 TEx. L. REv. 385 (1941); 3 VAND. L. REV. 597
(1950).
- See 3 VAND. L. REv. 597 (1950).
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The contracts or leases which are used by the national oil com-
panies vary from company to company, but as a general rule they
include clauses concerning the following elements: (1) delivery of
the products; (2) prices; (3) discounts; (4) taxes; and (5) regula-
tions as to who may sign agreements in the future.3 The contractual
relationship is very important as it is the court's interpretation of the
contract which determines whether the national oil company is liable
for the torts of the service station operator.4 The liability of the
national oil companies depends primarily on whether or not the court
can construe the contract to establish a master-servant or principal-
agent relationship,5 and this interpretation depends on the element
of control which is involved. If the court fails to find a sufficient ele-
ment of control involved in the contract the operator is considered to
be an independent contractor, thus relieving the national oil company
of liability.
The cases and their interpretations of the contracts indicate a split
of authority. One line of decisions holds that if the contract in ques-
tion, read in light of the conduct of the parties, grants to the national
oil company the general power or right to exercise control over its
filling station operators, the relationship of master-servant exists,6
while another line of decisions comes to the conclusion that the
national oil company must have the right or actually exercise the
right of control over the specific detail of the business in issue in
order to be held liable.7
Green v. Spinnings is a typical case in accord with the first line of
decisions. An injured third party was granted an injunction against
the operator of the station and his co-defendant, the Mid-Continent
Petroleum Corporation, on the ground that the filling station near his
home was a nuisance. The court talked in great detail about the
contract between the defendants and the elements contained therein,
stating:
'Joiner v. Sinclair Refining Co., 48 Ga. App. 365, 172 S.E. 754 (1934); Shell
Petroleum Corp. v. Linham, 163 So. 2d 839 (Miss. 1948); Texas Co. v. Wheat,
140 Tex. 468, 168 S.W. 2d 632 (1943); Texas Co. v. Mills, 177 Miss. 231, 156 So.
866 (1934); Greene v. Spinning, 48 S.W. 2d 51 (Mo. 1931).
'For a collection of cases on this general topic, see 116 A.L.R. 449, at 470.
' RESTATEmNT, AGENCY sec. 220 (1933), sets out various elements to be con-
sidered when determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an inde-
pendent contractor.
'Joiner v. Sinclair Refining Co., 48 Ga. App. 365, 172 S.E. 754 (1934);
Green v. Spinning, supra note 3.
' Cities Service Oil Co. v. Kindt, 190 P. 2d 1007 (Okla. 1948); Texas Co. v.
Wheat, supra note 8.
148 S.W. 2d 51 (Mo. 1931).
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One of the main criterions, if not the chief one, as to whether the
relationship of respondeat superior exists, is the right to control, and
it is not a question as to whether that control is actually assumed but
whether it exists. 9
The court, in concluding their discussion of the contract between the
operator "Spinning" and the Mid-Continent Petroleum Corporation,
further stated:
In our opinion these writings attempt to obligate Spinning 'in the
most binding way possible' in every important respect in relation to
the operation of the filling station. These writings have too many
provisions, conferring on the.... Company rights that only a principal
ordinarily enjoys, strongly indicative as to what legal effect these
writings should have when the rights of third persons are involved;
that the relationship of principal and agent is present in this case, we
have no doubt.'0
Thus there is imbedded in this problem a theory that the respondeat
superior relationship exists when the right to control is an element of
the contract regardless of whether or not it is exercised.
The other view is expressed in the case of Texas Co. v. Wheat,"
which involved a suit against the Texas Company for damages for
personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of a fall in front
of a service station which the defendant had leased to one Gossen.
It was found that some oil had been negligently washed across the
sidewalk in front of the service station, and the plaintiff, who was
walking by, slipped on the oil and fell. The plaintiff contended that
the relation of master-servant existed between Gossen and the Texas
Company, thus making the latter liable for the injuries resulting from
the negligent act. The court discussed at great length the relation
that existed between Gossen and the Texas Company, pointing out
various extra services, such as training schools on better ways to run
the service station business, which were afforded the filling station
operator although not appearing in the written contract. However,
the court found the Texas Company not liable, stating:
Whether or not the relation of master and servant existed between
the Texas Company and Gossen so as to make the doctrine of
respondeat superior applicable, depends on whether the Texas Com-
pany had the right to control Cossen in the details of the work to be
performed in the operation of the service station.' 2
Thus the Texas court has set up a narrow rule when it says the
doctrine of respondeat superior applies only when the company has
9 Supra note 8, at 57. ' oSupra note 8, at 58.
1140 Tex. 468, 168 S.W. 2d 632 (1943).
Id. 168 S.W. 2d 632, at 635.
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the right to control "... in the details of the work to be performed in
the operation of the service station." The court further stated with
regard to the fact that the injury occurred as a result of cleaning the
service station:
We think it clear from the evidence that the company did not have
the right nor did it undertake to exercise the right to control Gossen
and his employees in the details to be followed by them in keeping
the service station clean. They were free to perform such work as they
saw fit. They were therefore not acting as the employees of the com-
pany in cleaning the service station-the act out of which this injury
grew-and consequently the company is not liable for the negligence
of such employees.' 3
This last phase leaves a doubt in one's mind as to whether or not
the Texas Company would have been liable if an injury had occurred
because of Gossen's failure to keep the rest room within the minimum
standards of cleanliness set up by the company. This thought is raised
because Gossen displayed a sign advertising a "Texaco Registered
Rest Room" which the company provided only where the station's
rest rooms were kept up to certain standards. The company also had
their own personnel check such "Registered Rest Rooms," and if
they were not maintained in the proper manner the sign was removed.
Thus, does the fact that in order to keep this sign the dealer was
required to meet certain standards set up by the company constitute
the company's exercising control over the details of a certain phase
of the operation of the station? If it does, then the Texas Company
may have been liable if the injury occurred in the rest room because
of Gossen's failure to comply with the company standards. Under the
view taken in this case it would seem that the Texas court divided
the operation of a filling station into various segments, and if the
accident had occurred in the rest room because of failure to meet
company regulations, the company might be held liable. However,
as the accident resulted from the cleaning of the station, an operation
over which the court said the company had no control, they were not
held liable.
Thus it would seem that under the first line of decisions discussed,
the courts look at the contractual relationship in its entirety, while in
the second line of decisions they limit themselves to looking at each
clause individually in order to fix liability. There is also a third theory
which should be mentioned. Mechem, in his Outlines of the Law of
Agency states the theory as follows:
13 Ibid.
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.. . where the injury arises from negligence in the sale of the com-
pany's products, it is surprising that the element of estoppel is not
more relied on. One who has the family kerosene can filled from a
big truck labeled 'Gulf and receives a receipt bearing the same name,
might not unnaturally suppose that she was dealing with the Gulf
Company and she could rely on them in case the transaction mis-
carried. As pointed out above liability has been imposed on such a
basis in the case of an apparent ownership of stores, beauty parlors
and the like. There seems to be no evidence, however, that this theory
of liability has yet been applied to tank or service stations. 14
It is rather amazing to learn that in 1952, when the above quotation
first appeared, there was as yet not a single case adopting the theory
of estoppel with regard to this problem. One would think that, with
the uniform retailing and advertising carried on by national oil com-
panies, plus the fact that service stations have lost their individualistic
character in the eye of the average motorist, the courts when faced
with this problem would adopt the theory of estoppel rather than
become entangled in an interpretation of the various contracts and
leases which are involved.
Thus it would seem that this phase of the law has been resolved
into two lines of decisions based on the interpretation of the contracts
involved. One line holds that in determining if the respondeat superior
relationship exists the general right of control is the governing prin-
ciple and whether or not control is exercised is immaterial, while the
other advances the theory that the national oil company is not liable
for the torts of the station operators unless they have the right to con-
trol or actually do exercise control over the details of the operation
which are in issue.
GEoRGE D. ScBRDERm
,Sec. 442. See also Secs. 440-45 (4th Ed. 1952).
